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COMMENT

Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68
with Summary Judgments
ChanningJ. Turne4
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a typical lawsuit between two parties, plaintiff and
defendant. The litigants have reached the final days of pretrial
litigation, and like any good defense counsel, the defendant's
lawyer hopes to dismiss the case before going to trial. He moves
for summary judgment-increasingly common in modern litigationl-and raises the possibility of settlement with the plaintiff.
Hoping to strong-arm an end to the case, he decides to send the
plaintiff a special settlement offer under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 called an "offer of judgment." If the plaintiff accepts this offer, the court will automatically enter judgment
against the defendant according to the offer's terms. The case
will end. But if the plaintiff declines the offer, Rule 68 may
make the plaintiff liable for costs that the defendant incurs during subsequent litigation.2 This risk of increased costs means the
plaintiff should think seriously about accepting the offer.
Before the plaintiff makes a decision, however, the judge
grants full summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff
has lost-at least in the eyes of the court. But plaintiffs counsel
sees an opportunity to turn things around. As soon as he learns
of the summary judgment ruling, the plaintiff contacts the defendant to accept his offer of judgment. The defendant protests,
but the plaintiff points out that the Rule makes no exception for
t
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1 See Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 Marq L Rev
141, 143-44 (2000) (reporting that, in a limited sample of twenty volumes of the Federal
Reporter from 1973 and 1997-98, the proportion of cases terminating in summary judgment increased from about fourteen per volume in 1973 to forty-seven per volume in
1997-98).
2
FRCP 68(d).
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a grant of summary judgment. At the same time, plaintiff sends
the court notification of the offer and his acceptance, along with
a motion to amend the entry of summary judgment and enter final judgment against the defendant. If the court grants his motion, the plaintiff has succeeded in turning a certain defeat into
a victory.
This hypothetical illustrates the dilemma facing courts that
grant summary judgment during a pending offer of judgment.
Rule 68 is a rigid procedural mechanism. Once made, the litigants cannot revoke a Rule 68 offer. And once accepted, the Rule
appears to mandate entry of judgment. The plaintiff3 has fourteen days to accept an offer before it is considered withdrawn, 4
and if the plaintiff accepts during this period, the court clerk
"must" enter judgment according to the defendant's terms. 5
This language has caused a split in federal and state courts
as to whether a grant of summary judgment during the fourteen-day acceptance period ends the plaintiffs power to accept
an offer or whether a plaintiff can still accept even after summary judgment has been granted. The implications of this issue
for litigants and our adversarial system are significant. If a
plaintiff can accept an offer of judgment even after the case
would otherwise end in summary judgment, then he can essentially win his case despite having lost on the merits.
This Comment begins with the intuition that something
about the entry of judgments makes it different from all other
events that might occur during an outstanding Rule 68 offer.
Unlike, say, the death of a witness or a ruling on the exclusion of
evidence, the operation and purposes of Rule 68 suggest that it
should afford special significance to an order disposing of the
case.
Accordingly, this Comment advances two ideas: First, offer
and acceptance in Rule 68 should be viewed as procedural, rather than contractual. And second, entry of final judgment, but
not necessarily summary judgment, should abrogate the operation of Rule 68. To get there, Part I introduces Rule 68 by explaining its operation and its drafters' possible intent. Part II introduces the conflict between Rule 68 and summary judgment
3 Rule 68 uses the terms "party defending against a claim" and "opposing party" in
order to include counterclaims, cross claims, and third-party claims. FRCP 68(a). Consistent with the existing literature, this Comment simply refers to "plaintiff' and "defendant" to distinguish between the party bringing a claim and the party defending a
claim, whether or not that party would be the actual plaintiff or defendant at trial.
4
FRCP 68(b).
5
FRCP 68(a).
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and charts the approaches courts take in interpreting Rule 68
and similar state rules. Part III proposes a new procedural conception of offer and acceptance in the context of Rule 68. It
shines a finer light on the ubiquitous yet easily confused court
orders called "judgments" in order to distinguish summary
judgment from its more procedurally significant counterpart, final judgment. It then leverages the standard for amending
judgments to argue that final judgment nullifies a Rule 68 offer.
Finally, Part III ends by explaining how this interpretation
promotes the purposes and operation of Rule 68.
I. RULE 68'S PURPOSE AND PROBLEMS
Before launching into interpretation, it's important to understand why Rule 68 comes into conflict with the law of judgments. This Part begins by explaining Rule 68's operation and
the historical context that guides courts in interpreting it. Then,
it describes Rule 68's doctrine of irrevocability and how courts
have conceptualized the Rule's offer-acceptance procedure in
light of the Rule's textual ambiguity.
"The Most Enigmatic of the Federal Rules"6

A.

7
At first glance, Rule 68 appears fairly simple. Rule 68 allows a defendant-but not a plaintiff8-to serve an offer on the
plaintiff to settle a case for a certain dollar amount or other relief. If the plaintiff decides to accept the offer within fourteen
days, either party can file the offer, notice of acceptance, and
9
proof of the original service with the court. Until this point, the
court has no involvement in-and may not even know aboutthe offer. Once filed, the court then enters judgment according to
the offer's terms. 10 However, if the plaintiff does not accept the
offer and subsequently wins a judgment "not more favorable

6
7

Crossman v Marcoccio, 806 F2d 329, 331 (1st Cir 1986).
FRCP 68(a) states:
At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim
may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms,
with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing
party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the
offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter
judgment.

8 See FRCP 68(a) (allowing "a party defending against a claim" to make an offer of
judgment but giving no comparable power to a party bringing a claim).
9 FRCP 68(a).
10 FRCP 68(a).
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than the unaccepted offer," the plaintiff must pay all costs incurred by the defendant after the offer was made."
Despite this apparent simplicity, Rule 68 has been described
as "among the most enigmatic of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"12 in large part because it leaves many basic questions
unanswered. For example, what expenses qualify as "costs"? For
the most part, the costs of litigation in Rule 68 have been interpreted similarly to other areas of the Federal Rules.13 However,
the Supreme Court significantly upped the ante in Marek v
Chesny' 4 by holding that costs under Rule 68 also include any
expense labeled as "costs" in the substantive statute underlying
a lawsuit, making those costs orders of magnitude higher in cases that involve a substantive fee-shifting statute. 15
Plenty of other questions surrounding Rule 68 still have no
clear answer. For example, are offers that disclaim liability invalid?16 May a defendant ever revoke an offer before the fourteen-day acceptance period lapses?17 Must offers provide for the
relief requested in the plaintiffs complaint? 18 And how should
courts construe offers when the defendant leaves the scope of
proffered recovery ambiguous? 19
History provides good reason to think that these ambiguities will not be easily resolved through revision or amendment.
11

FRCP 68(d).
Crossman, 806 F2d at 331. See also Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68: Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settlement Rule by Injecting Certainty into Offers of
Judgment, 91 Minn L Rev 865, 876-921 (2007) (canvassing the many areas of uncertainty in interpreting and applying Rule 68).
13 See Marek v Chesny, 473 US 1, 13-14 (1985) (Brennan dissenting) (asserting
that "costs" under Rule 68 have traditionally been interpreted as those taxable costs defined in 28 USC § 1920, including "court fees, printing expenses, and the like").
14 473 US 1 (1985).
15 Id at 9. See also Christopher W. Carmichael, Encouraging Settlements Using
Federal Rule 68: Why Non-prevailing Defendants Should Be Awarded Attorney's Fees,
Even in Civil Rights Cases, 48 Wayne L Rev 1449, 1455-58 (2003) (describing the interaction between Rule 68 and substantive statutes that include a shifted duty to pay attorney's fees).
16 See Shelton, 91 Minn L Rev at 881-83 (cited in note 12) (finding that, despite
near uniformity of agreement that a valid offer of judgment can disclaim liability, some
courts continue to reject such offers, creating "continuing uncertainty and resulting [in]
collateral litigation").
17 See id at 883-86 (outlining the split between cases that find Rule 68 offers "categorically" irrevocable and cases that leave open the possibility of revocation under limited circumstances).
'8
See id at 886-88 (describing confusion over whether an offer that provides only
injunctive relief when money damages are sought is valid).
19 See id at 888-915 (canvassing cases in which confusion exists over whether the
defendant intended to include attorney's fees and whether the amount of the defendant's
offer includes costs then accrued).
12
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Multiple efforts to amend the Rule have failed. In 1983-84, an
effort to change the Rule provoked intense controversy that ul-°
timately led to abandonment of the suggested amendments.2
Another effort in 1992-93 fared no better.21
In the face of all this uncertainty, it's natural to turn to Rule
68's purpose as a guide for interpretation. However, understanding Rule 68's purpose presents problems of its own. The Supreme Court has said that Rule 68 was adopted to "encourage
settlement and avoid litigation" by "prompt[ing] both parties to
a suit to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance
them against the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits."22 Thus, courts have universally accepted settlement promotion as the Rule's guiding principle.23
Yet, judges, lawyers, and commentators alike doubt the
Rule's ability to actually promote settlement.4 When the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules proposed amendments to the
Rule in 1983, it acknowledged that the Rule "rarely has been invoked and has been considered largely ineffective as a means of
achieving its goals."25 Commentators have speculated that the
ambiguities left unresolved by the Rule's text undermine its
purpose by discouraging litigants from utilizing it.26 A survey of
See Roy D. Simon Jr, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 12-19 (1985)
(describing the efforts of defense lawyers to promote the proposed amendment and opposition from the plaintiffs bar and civil rights lawyers).
21 See Lesley S. Bonney, Robert J. Tribeck, and James S. Wrona, Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 Geo Wash L Rev 379, 380-81 (1997) (describing Rule 68's descent into obscurity and the renewed attention it received from efforts to revise it in the
1990s); David A. Anderson and Thomas D. Rowe Jr, Empirical Evidence on Settlement
Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?, 71 Chi Kent L Rev 519, 519 n 2 (1995).
22 Marek, 473 US at 5 (describing the Court's interpretation of Rule 68's purpose).
See also Delta Air Lines, Inc v August, 450 US 346, 352 (1981) ("The purpose of Rule 68
is to encourage the settlement of litigation."). But see Robert G. Bone, "To Encourage
Settlement": Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 102 Nw U L Rev 1561, 1566 (2008) ("[Tlhere is a serious problem with this
view of Rule 68.").
23 See, for example, Perkins v US West Communications, 138 F3d 336, 338 (8th Cir
1998) (stating that "[t]he purpose of Rule 68 is to promote the compromise and settlement of litigation"), citing Delta Air Lines, 450 US at 352 n 8.
24 See Simon, 54 Geo Wash L Rev at 6-7 (cited in note 20) ("Many lawyers and
judges believe that rule 68 has failed to encourage settlement."). For an empirical study
of whether Rule 68 encourages settlement, see generally Anderson and Rowe, 71 Chi
Kent L Rev 519 (cited in note 21).
25 Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Appellate Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and Section 2255 Proceedings in the United
States District Courts, 102 FRD 407, 433 (1984).
26 See Shelton, 91 Minn L Rev at 921 (cited in note 12) ("[T]he rule's lack of clarity
with regard to offers undermines its very purpose.'); Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, the Modified
20
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practicing civil rights and employment-discrimination attorneys
published in 2007 provides anecdotal confirmation that uncertainties can make Rule 68 unattractive.27
Notwithstanding its critics, there is reason to think Rule 68
has evolved into a potent strategic tool in specific situations.
Marek transformed Rule 68 into a "powerful settlement weapon"
in cases that involve attorney's-fee-shifting provisions.28 For example, civil rights cases commonly involve fee-shifting provisions that lump attorney's fees under "costs" awarded to a prevailing plaintiff.29 Looking beyond dollars and cents, Rule 68 has
also been used strategically to knock out the named plaintiff in
class action lawsuits-a controversial practice that the Supreme
Court recently declined to address in Genesis HealthCareCorp v
Symczyk. 3o And a Rule 68 acceptance following an adverse summary judgment-this Comment's topic-also has significant
strategic implications.
Faced with the broad uncertainty and increasing strategic
importance of Rule 68, it seems inevitable that courts would encounter procedural conflicts between Rule 68 and other Federal
Rules. One of the most striking of these-and one this Comment
hopes to clarify-is a conflict between the way courts have interpreted the mechanics of Rule 68 and the typical operation of
summary judgment.
B.

The Leap from Irrevocable Offers to Option Contracts

While it might seem natural to abrogate a rule concerning
settlement when the court grants summary judgment, a principal tenet of Rule 68's interpretation complicates the calculation:
the irrevocability of an offer of judgment. Most litigation over
Rule 68 has tackled the question of whether an offer can be
British Rule, and Civil Litigation Reform, 1 Mich L & Pol Rev 73, 97 (1996) (concluding
that fee-shifting and penalization schemes like Rule 68 are unlikely to encourage settlement).
27 See Harold S. Lewis Jr and Thomas A. Eaton, Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: The
Practicesand Opinions of Experienced Civil Rights and Employment DiscriminationAttorneys, 241 FRD 332, 350-56 (2007) (suggesting reasons for Rule 68's underuse, including uncertainty about whether judgments reached through Rule 68 could include a nonadmission-of-liability clause).
28 See Simon, 54 Geo Wash L Rev at 23 (cited in note 20) (claiming that Marek
"transformed rule 68 into a powerful settlement weapon").
29 See Lewis and Eaton, 241 FRD at 333-34 (cited in note 27) (noting that the
"great bulk of contemporary federal question litigation is founded on statutes that
do
award fees as part of costs," including most civil rights legislation, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and many environmental statutes).
30 133 S Ct 1523, 1526 (2013) (declining to decide the merits after holding that the
plaintiffs case was moot).
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revoked by the defendant before the end of the statutory time
period for acceptance. 31 The text of Rule 68 allows acceptance
"within 14 days after being served,"32 but it makes no mention of
a defendant's power of revocation or whether other events may
destroy the plaintiffs power of acceptance. On the other hand,
the Rule is unequivocal in instructing the court to enter judgment upon notification of acceptance within fourteen days. 33 The
implications of this language have almost universally persuaded
courts to make offers of judgment irrevocable during the fourteen-day period, although they differ on whether offers are "categorically" irrevocable or can be revoked under certain excep34
tional circumstances.
Typically, the defendant seeks to revoke an offer only if he
discovers some error after having made it. This was the case in
Fisher v Stolaruk Corp,35 when the defendant attempted to rescind his offer of judgment after his attorney failed to realize
that the term "costs" under Rule 68 does not include attorney's
36
fees unless they are additionally provided for in the agreement.
The defendant attempted to add attorney's fees to his offer, but
the plaintiff interpreted the attempt as an impermissible withdrawal and purported to accept the existing terms. 37 The Fisher
court held that a mistake of law made by one party that the other party knows about-or should have known about-warranted
allowing withdrawal by the defendant.38
However, most courts conclude that they have no discretion
to prevent entry of judgment upon acceptance of the offer. In
Richardson v National Railroad Passenger Corp,39 the court

31 See Wersch v Radnor/Landgrant-APhoenix Partnership,961 P2d 1047, 1049 n
3 (Ariz App 1997) ("The majority of litigation involving Rule 68 centers on whether offers
of judgment can be withdrawn or revoked.").
32 FRCP 68(a).
33 FRCP 68(a).
34 Compare Richardson v National Railroad PassengerCorp, 49 F3d 760, 765 (DC
Cir 1995) (holding "categorically" that "a Rule 68 offer is simply not revocable during the
10-day period"), with Fisher v Stolaruk Corp, 110 FRD 74, 76 (ED Mich 1986) (holding
that defendant is entitled to rescind a Rule 68 offer when the offer was made under a
mistaken interpretation of law).
35 110 FRD 74 (ED Mich 1986).
36 Id at 75.
37
38

Id.

Id at 76 (explaining that the defendant had satisfied the four technical requirements to allow rescission: (1) the mistake must make enforcement unconscionable, (2)
the mistake must be material, (3) the mistake must have occurred despite the exercise of
ordinary care, and (4) the other party must be able to return to the position of the status
quo ante).
39 49 F3d 760 (DC Cir 1995).

368
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squarely rejected a defendant's attempt to revoke an offer of
judgment during the statutory period of acceptance. The defendant allegedly discovered information that discredited medical
testimony regarding the nature of the plaintiffs injuries.40 The
court held "categorically" that "a Rule 68 offer is simply not revocable" during the statutory period.41 The Ninth Circuit in Erdman v Cochise County, Arizona42 also did not allow revocation
when the defendant failed to recognize that "costs" in the context of a 42 USC § 1983 case automatically include attorney's
fees post-Marek.43 Instead, the court reversed a grant of withdrawal and forced the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the
44
amount agreed.
In Mallory v Eyrich,45 the defendant attempted a slightly
different strategy that, while not truly an attempt to revoke,
could be thought of as an attempt to achieve the same result. Instead of trying to withdraw the offer, the defendant sought relief
from the judgment entered against him.46 Characterizing Rule
68 as "self-executing," the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the
court has no discretion to withhold its entry or otherwise to frustrate the agreement." 47 The court reasoned that the offer of
judgment's special cost-shifting mechanism makes a judgment
resulting from it less amenable to change or abrogation.48 Ultimately, the court upheld the judgment, concluding that the defendant had not presented a sufficient basis to afford relief. 49
The question of when a defendant may revoke an offer has
led many courts and commentators to compare Rule 68 with a
contractual tool that also prevents withdrawal: the option contract. Under general principles of contract law, an offer made by
one party generally gives the second party the power to accept
that offer and create a binding contract unless it is revoked

Id at 762.
Id at 765.
42 926 F2d 877 (9th Cir 1991).
43 Id at 879.
44 Idat 883.
45 922 F2d 1273 (6th Cir 1991).
46 Id at 1275-76.
47 Id at 1279.
48 Id at 1280 ("Its unique characteristics-a cost-shifting provision and absence of
court discretion in implementation-make such a judgment less amenable to change or
abrogation than an ordinary consent judgment.").
49 Mallory, 922 F2d at 1280-81 (surveying the six grounds for relief under Rule
60(b) as well as Supreme Court clarification of the Rule and concluding that the defendant failed to state adequate grounds for relief).
40
41
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before acceptance occurs. 50 A promise that meets the requirements of a contract and limits the offeror's power to revoke for a
defined period of time constitutes an option contract,51 giving the
offeree a guaranteed power to accept those terms during an allotted period of time.52 Thus, by many interpretations, Rule 68
operates like an option contract.
In Fisher, for example, the court held that offers of judgment should be governed by background contract principles and
that such offers are therefore revocable when a mistake is
made. 53 Similarly, in Colonial Penn Insurance Co v Coil,54 the
Fourth Circuit held that an offer could be withdrawn when it
was induced by fraud55-an easily recognizable contract principle.56 The Richardson court also explicitly endorsed the optioncontract comparison. 57 Accordingly, Rule 68 has developed a
reputation for walking and talking like a contract, and most
58
courts regularly equate the two.
II. RULE 68'S CLASH WITH SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Courts that grant summary judgment for the defendant but
are asked to enforce an accepted offer of judgment face a unique
dilemma: the court has determined that one party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, while the parties have procedurally
mandated the opposite conclusion. This Part describes the current

50 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 35(1) (1981) ("An offer gives to the offeree a continuing power to complete the manifestation of mutual assent by acceptance of
the offer."); id at § 36(1) ("An offeree's power of acceptance may be terminated by (a) rejection or counter-offer by the offeree, or (b) lapse of time, or (c) revocation by the offeror,
or (d) death or incapacity of the offeror or offeree.").
51 See id at § 25.
52 See Richard A. Lord, 1 Williston on Contracts § 5:16 at 1022 (West 4th ed 2012)
("The traditional view regards an option as a unilateral contract which binds the optionee to do nothing, but grants him or her the right to accept or reject the offer in accordance with its terms within the time and in the manner specified in the option.").
53 Fisher, 110 FRD at 76.
54 887 F2d 1236 (4th Cir 1989).
55 Id at 1240.
56 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(1) (1981).
57 Richardson, 49 F3d at 765 ("[T]he plaintiff, as we understand the scheme, is
guaranteed 10 days to ponder the matter (as though the plaintiff had paid for a 10-day
option).").
58 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Richard L. Marcus, 12 Federal
Practiceand Procedure § 3002 at 94 (West 2d ed 1997 & Supp 2013) ("As a general matter, it is agreed that since Rule 68 offers are basically offers of settlement their provisions should be interpreted according to contract law principles."). But see Shorter v Valley Bank & Trust Co, 678 F Supp 714, 719 (ND Il 1988) ("[T]he arrangement here is not
a simple contract; it involves an accepted offer of judgment, and there is a difference.").
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legal landscape of courts attempting to reconcile this conflictwith wildly divergent results.
A.

Courts Allowing Rule 68 to Override Summary Judgment

In Perkins v US West Communications,59 the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the power to accept a Rule 68 offer remains open
notwithstanding summary judgment.60 The dispute in Perkins
fits perfectly into the template for a conflict between offer of
judgment and summary judgment. Prior to trial, US West
Communications moved for summary judgment in a Title VII

sex-discrimination case against

it.61

While the judgment was

pending, and before a trial date had been set, US West Communications also made a Rule 68 offer of judgment.62 Two days later, and without knowledge of the offer, the district court granted
summary judgment and filed a separate final judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint.63 When the plaintiff learned about the
entry of judgment, plaintiff filed a notice of acceptance of the offer of judgment and moved to amend the court's earlier judgment in favor of the defendant.64 The district court granted the
motion, awarding plaintiff the terms set forth in defendant's offer.65

The Eighth Circuit affirmed.66 The court turned first to Rule
68's role in the promotion of settlements. It reasoned that the
Rule prompts both parties to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation and to balance them against the likelihood of success. 67
Thus, the defendant's offer amounted to a strategic decision that
had consequences he or she must accept. 68 The defendant also
failed to condition acceptance of the offer on the outcome of the
motion for summary judgment, the court noted.69
The court also determined that the plain language of Rule
68 mandates recognition of a plaintiffs acceptance. By saying

138 F3d 336 (8th Cir 1998).
Id at 339.
61
Id at 337.
62 Id.
63 Perkins, 138 F3d at 337.
64 Id at 337-38.
65 Idat 338.
66 Id at 340.
67 Perkins, 138 F3d at 338, quoting Marek, 473 US at 5 ('The Rule prompts both
parties to a suit to evaluate the risks and costs of litigation, and to balance them against
the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits.").
68 Perkins, 138 F3d at 338.
69 Id at 339.
59

60
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that the clerk "shall" enter judgment, 7o the Rule leaves no room
for interference by the court to alter or modify the parties'
agreement. 71 The only exception to this mandatory procedure,
the court reasoned, occurs if the deal contemplates illegal activity.72 In interpreting Rule 68 this way, the court relied heavily on
two state-court decisions that had reached the same conclusion:
Centric-Jones Co v Hufnage73 and Hernandez v United Super74
markets of Oklahoma, Inc.
In Centric-Jones, the Colorado Supreme Court came to the
same conclusion regarding Colorado's version of Rule 68, but it
provided a much more detailed justification. The essential facts
closely paralleled Perkins, but this time, two defendants had extended a joint offer of judgment to the plaintiff, Centric-Jones
C. 75 When the trial court granted summary judgment for one of
the two defendants based on the statute of limitations, both defendants immediately attempted to withdraw the offer and the
76
plaintiff attempted to accept.
First, the court affirmed the "well-established and persuasive" view that offers of judgment are irrevocable for the allotted
statutory period. 77 But this irrevocable nature does not come
from contract principles, the court reasoned. Instead the court
viewed an offer under Rule 68 as part of a "special statutory process" that should be enforced without "engrafting contract principles onto it."8 The statute describes a mandatory proceeding
that vests all discretion with the parties, not the courts.7 9 The
court has no discretion to award costs to the prevailing party if
the offer is refused and the subsequent trial judgment obtained
is less favorable to the offeree than the offer, nor does it have
discretion to alter or modify the judgment agreed upon by the
parties.80

70 The older revision of Rule 68(a) used the word "shall." The general stylistic version of the Federal Rules changed this to "must" in the current version.
71 Perkins, 138 F3d at 338 (noting that entry of Rule 68 pursuant to notification of
acceptance is mandatory).
72 Id at 338 n 5, citing Kasper v Board of Election Commissioners, 814 F2d 332, 338
(7th Cir 1987).
73 848 P2d 942 (Colo 1993) (en banc).
74 882 P2d 84 (Okla Civ App 1994).
75 Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 945.
76 Id.
77 Id at 946.
78 Id.
79 Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 947.
80 Id.
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Next, the court reasoned that allowing acceptance after
summary judgment would not conflict with the purpose of an offer of judgment.81 In the court's view, the risk of a summary
judgment decision was apparent to both parties at the time the
defendant extended the offer. The defendant enjoys total control
over the inherent risks of an offer-unlike the plaintiff, who
cannot refuse the offer without incurring a risk of cost shifting
later. If the plaintiff risks having to pay costs if he recovers less
than the offer, the defendant should have to risk losing an opportunity to lower its costs through summary judgment.2 Finally, the court reasoned that allowing summary judgment to affect
the acceptance period for offers of judgment would remove the
"definitiveness and predictability" needed to effectively promote
83
settlement under the statute.
While the majority in Centric-Jones disregarded contract
principles, Justice William Erickson's concurrence adopted them
to reach the same result. The irrevocable nature of the offer
comes from its status as an option contract, he wrote, because
the offeror receives valuable consideration in exchange for guaranteed power of acceptance for the statutory period8 4 Like an
option contract, the offer of judgment can be terminated under
only certain circumstances-"lapse of time, death, or destruction
of a person or thing essential for the performance of the proposed contract, or a supervening legal prohibition relating to the
proposed contract." 5 The expiry of the option contract is set by
statute, and summary judgment does not destroy the object of
the contract-the pending lawsuit-because proceedings have
not yet reached "final resolution."86 Even after final judgment
has been entered, an appeals court could still overturn the grant
of summary judgment and return the case for a new trial. Thus,
the defendant remained a party to the action and could still
serve an offer of judgment at any time prior to the start of the
trial.87 Finally, Justice Erickson distinguished summary judgment from final judgment, arguing that summary judgment does
81

82

Idat948.

Id at 947-48.
Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 948.
84 Id at 948-49 n 1 (Erickson concurring), citing Morris K. Udall, May Offers of
Judgment under Rule 68 Be Revoked before Acceptance?, 19 FRD 401, 403 (1957) (characterizing offers of judgments as 'like an option that you have for ten days based upon a
valuable consideration").
85 Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 949 (Erickson concurring), citing Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 37 (1981).
86
Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 949 (Erickson concurring).
87 Id at 949 n 3 (Erickson concurring).
83
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not truly dispose of an action unless the trial court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and directs entry
of final judgment on the docket.S8 Justice Erickson took this one
step further by suggesting that the offer of judgment itself pre9
vented the summary judgment order from becoming final8
This contract-based approach was expressly adopted in
Hernandez. The Oklahoma court of appeals adopted the reasoning of Justice Erickson's concurrence in Centric-Jones.9o The
court treated the grant of summary judgment as interlocutory
based on the existence of the outstanding offer, holding that the
summary judgment ruling "remained open to modification, reconsideration or withdrawal" until the end of the acceptance period.91
B.

Courts Abrogating Rule 68 after Summary Judgment

Justice Anthony Vollack's dissent in Centric-Jones argued
for cutting off the plaintiffs power of acceptance after an intervening grant of summary judgment.92 Like the majority in Perkins, Justice Vollack used a plain-language approach, but he
would have held that a plaintiff cannot accept an offer after losing summary judgment. According to Justice Vollack, the section
of the Colorado equivalent of Rule 68 stating that "an offer not
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn" and that an offer "made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer" is consistent with common-law applications of the power of acceptance
and revocation9 s He rejected the idea that offers of judgment are
irrevocable and should be treated as option contracts. Instead,
Justice Vollack applied garden-variety contract principles that
allow offerors to revoke unless the offeree has accepted. 94 Thus,
because both defendants had manifested intent to withdraw before Centric-Jones had accepted, the acceptance was invalid. 95

Id at 950 (Erickson concurring).
Id at 949 (Erickson concurring) ("Any trial court ruling made during the period of
time the offer is outstanding is effective and valid, subject only to a possibility that the
ruling will be of no consequence if the offer of judgment is accepted.").
90 Hernandez, 882 P2d at 88-89. Oklahoma's offer-of-judgment statute used different language from Rule 68, but the Oklahoma court's decision to adopt the Erickson interpretation from Centric-Jones without engaging in substantial inquiry suggests that
the court felt that the statutes operated similarly.
91 Id at 89, quoting Centric-Jones, 848 P2d at 950 (Erickson concurring).
92 Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 950 (Vollack dissenting).
93 Id at 955-56 (Vollack dissenting).
94 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 35(1) (1981).
95 Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 957 (Vollack dissenting).
88
89
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Alternatively, Justice Vollack determined that the power of
acceptance was conditioned on the "availability" of all parties to
the offer.96 Unlike the majority, he viewed the grant of summary
judgment as equivalent to dismissing a party from the lawsuit,
making them unavailable for the purposes of the offer.97 Finally,
Justice Vollack appealed to the "inherent power of district courts
to resolve disputes,"98 suggesting that even if the language of the
offer-of-judgment rule does not explicitly give a court the power
to intervene, this power is assumed.
Justice Vollack failed to persuade a majority of justices on
the Colorado Supreme Court, but the Eastern District of Tennessee in Day v Krystal Company99 picked up his torch. The Day
court argued that plaintiffs should not be allowed to use an offer
of judgment as an end run around summary judgment. More
than other courts, it emphasized the value of finality after entry
of final judgment. The court seized on the necessity of balancing
"the need for finality with the need to render just decisions."100
For support, the Day court also looked to the Arizona case,
01 which
Wersch v Radnor/Landgrant-A Phoenix Partnership,1
concluded that a grant of summary judgment embracing the
same issues contained in the offer of judgment effectively precluded a party's ability to accept that offer.102 The trial courts in
Day and Wersch had entered orders of final judgment in the
court dockets before the plaintiffs attempted to amend the
judgment.103 The court in Wersch stretched finality a bit further
than the federal standard by stating that "the summary judgment-even in unsigned minute-entry form-resolved all of the
issues between the plaintiffs and this defendant" and thus could

96

Id at 957 n 5 (Vollack dissenting).
Id (Vollack dissenting).
98 Id at 957 n 6 (Vollack dissenting) ("The inherent powers which courts possess
consist of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to efficiently perform its judicial functions."), citing Halaby, McCrea & Cross v Hoffman, 831 P2d 902, 907 (Colo
1992).
99 241 FRD 474 (ED Tenn 2007).
100 Id at 479.
101 961 P2d 1047 (Ariz App 1998).
102 Wersch, 961 P2d at 1050 (holding that "where summary judgment encompasses
the same issues as those contained in the offer of judgment, summary judgment precludes a party's ability to accept a pending offer of judgment").
103 Day, 241 FRD at 475 ("Plaintiff accepted the offer of judgment after the Court
had already entered a final judgment in favor of Defendant .. ");Wersch, 961 P2d at
1050 ("While a partial summary judgment may be changed prior to entry of final judgment, ... the judgment involved here was later certified as finally and formally entered.").
97
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be treated as a final judgment.0 Generally, federal courts do not
accept minute orders as final judgments. 1°0 To avoid this procedural wrinkle, Day distinguishes itself from Wersch by pointing
to the fact that the Wersch court had granted summary judgment to only one of multiple parties in the case. It suggested
that, despite the Wersch court's belief to the contrary, the decision was not final because "it did not resolve all claims in the action since there were other defendants in the action that were
not privy to the summary judgment motion."106 Nonetheless, Day
still adopted the Wersch court's view of final judgment as the
close of the case, rendering any further attempts to settle "futile."107 It also reasoned that, under "circumstances not contemplated by the rule," including an entry of final judgment, the
mandatory nature of a Rule 68 offer yields to competing considerations.108
For added support, Day also appealed to the policies behind
summary judgment and the Federal Rules generally. Summary
judgment, it noted, seeks to secure "just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action."'1 9 The court reasoned that allowing Rule 68 to override summary judgments would frustrate its
purpose. It also noted that allowing the plaintiff to nullify summary judgment had the effect of holding Rule 68 in "higher esteem" than FRCP 56.110 In the court's opinion, a better reading
would give effect to both rules by allowing Rule 68 to operate up
until the point summary judgment is rendered."' Furthermore,
no defendant would ever make a Rule 68 motion if it held the
power to reverse a favorable summary judgment ruling.12 Allowing acceptance would essentially punish that defendant for
offering to settle the case, the court reasoned, working against
the settlement-promoting purpose of Rule 68 and giving the
104 Wersch, 961 P2d at 1050.
105 See FRCP 58(a); ABF Capital Corp, a Delaware Corporation v Osley, 414 F3d

1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir 2005) (holding that a district court's minute order did not substitute for an entry of judgment in a separate document). But see Perry v Sheet Metal
Workers' Local No 73 Pension Fund, 585 F3d 358, 361-62 (7th Cir 2009) (suggesting
that, although the court would not reach the argument, minute entries may satisfy the
separate-document requirement in a future case).
106 Day, 241 FRD at 477 n 2.
107 Id at 478.
108 Id. See also Colonial Penn Insurance Co, 887 F2d at 1240 ("[W]e believe that
there are exceptional factual situations that may properly merit revocation of offers
made pursuant to Rule 68.").
109 Day, 241 FRD at 478.
110 Id.
111 Id at 478-79.
112

Id.
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plaintiff-who normally could not have prevailed as a matter of
law-a windfall. 113

Taken as a whole, these cases demonstrate that both sides
of this issue wield strong textual and policy support for their positions. Courts appear to have reached an impasse. Rather than
focusing on the legal deadlock, this Comment reconsiders the
way courts interpret Rule 68 in order to offer a more holistic solution.
III. RECONCILING RULE 68 WITH SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
This Part argues for a compromise of sorts by proposing that
Rule 68 should be allowed to override court orders up until the
entry of final judgment. First, it explores how courts might read
Rule 68 to interpret the Rule, not as a contract, but as a stipulation. This Part argues that courts can interfere in the offeracceptance process in instances in which the court has the power
to abrogate stipulations. Then, this proposal uses the different
standards that govern amendment of summary and final judgments to justify the position that offers of judgment may control
the outcome of a case up until entry of final judgment. Finally,
this Part ends with several policy justifications for this interpretation of Rule 68.
A.

Reconsidering the Meaning of an "Offer to Allow Judgment"

The mechanics of offer-acceptance and entering judgment in
Rule 68 have often been interpreted as the formation of an option contract that becomes a binding settlement contract upon
acceptance. But a closer examination of the Rule's structure
shows this conception is not necessary--or even particularly justified. The relevant section of Rule 68 states:
[A] party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with
the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served,
the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance,
plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment."1

113
114

Day, 241 FRD at 479.
FRCP 68(a).
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But what does an "offer to allow judgment" or "acceptance"
of that offer mean within the context of Rule 68? The terms "offer" and "acceptance" have obvious contract connotations. Contract law defines acceptance as the manifestation of assent to an
offer,"15 which can give rise to a binding contract. Thus, many
courts have-not unreasonably-analyzed Rule 68 under contract principles 16 and have conceptualized acceptance as forming a binding settlement contract. 117 However, Rule 68 conspicuously omits any reference to the formation of a contract, and the
Supreme Court has never used contract principles to interpret
it. In fact, some courts explicitly or implicitly decline to characterize the Rule in contractual terms. 18 A few courts interpreting
an offer's terms have also sensed a difference between Rule 68
and a "simple contract.""19 These courts have not articulated a
strong rationale for treating offers of judgment as separate from
contracts, 20 but the logic behind their instinct becomes clearer
upon further examination.
1. Comparing Rule 68 to contracts and stipulations.
While they look similar at first, the limited scope and consequences of a Rule 68 agreement distinguish it from a typical settlement contract. First, a contract's flexibility and the breadth of
its potential terms make it significantly more versatile than an
agreement reached through Rule 68. For example, parties using
a settlement contract can simply dismiss a case without entering
formal judgment or admitting liability. In contrast, litigants
cannot rely on courts to uphold disclaimers of liability in a Rule
115 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50(1) (1981).
116 See, for example, Whitaker v Associated Credit Services, Inc, 946 F2d 1222, 1226
(6th Cir 1991). See also Wright, Miller, and Marcus, 12 Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3002 at 94 (cited in note 58) ("As a general matter, it is agreed that since Rule 68 offers
are basically offers of settlement their provisions should be interpreted according to contract law principles.").
117 See, for example, Mallory, 922 F2d at 1279 ("[A] Rule 68 judgment results from a
binding contract."); Whitaker, 946 F2d at 1226 (disregarding an offer of judgment because the offer and acceptance did not result in "an enforceable contract").
11 See, for example, Centric-Jones, 848 P2d at 946 (refusing to engraft contract
principles onto Rule 68's operation and characterizing the Rule as a "special statutory
process"); Perkins, 138 F3d at 336 (analyzing Rule 68 without comparing it to a contract).
119 Shorter v Valley Bank & Trust Co, 678 F Supp 714, 720 (ND Ill 1988) ("[T]he arrangement here is not a simple contract; it involves an accepted offer of judgment, and
there is a difference."). See also Webb v James, 147 F3d 617, 621 (7th Cir 1998) ("Rule 68
'contracts' should therefore be treated differently than ordinary contracts.").
120 See Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 946 (characterizing Rule 68's operation as a "special statutory process," rather than the operation of contract rules); Perkins, 138 F3d at
336 (offering no explanation for the court's avoidance of contract comparisons).
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68 agreement. 121 And courts do not allow conditions that require
confidentiality.122 Second, settlement contracts allow parties to
create their own enforcement mechanisms and terms of default.
But Rule 68 necessarily involves judicial mechanisms, and proper acceptance necessarily ends in entry of judgment. 123 Third,
Rule 68 agreements can arise only prior to trial. Settlement contracts, however, can be made at any time during the case, including after trial if the parties are unhappy with the result. Finally, if Rule 68's drafters intended the Rule to incorporate
contract principles, they could have saved time by simply using
the term "option contract." Instead, the Rule specifies the peculiar action of "offer[ing] to allow judgment on specified terms."124
Thus, Rule 68 does not explicitly invoke contract principles and
fits awkwardly into our conceptions of how settlement contracts
operate.
A better fit emerges by looking to contract's narrower
cousin, the stipulation. A stipulation is any "promise or agreement with reference to a pending judicial proceeding, made by a
party to the proceeding or his attorney, [that] is binding without
consideration."' 125 Stipulations closely resemble contracts, but the
agreement they contain is limited to "a pending judicial proceeding."126 Stipulations also follow slightly different rules from contracts. 127 Proper stipulations still become enforceable on the parties within a judicial proceeding,128 but "a court has the inherent
power to avoid a stipulation in law or equity."129 For example,
stipulations materially affecting aspects of litigation procedure
sometimes require court approval, 130 and some courts have held

See Shelton, 91 Minn L Rev at 881-83 (cited in note 12).
See Wright, Miller, and Marcus, 12 Federal Practice and Procedure § 3002 at 18
(2013 Supp) (cited in note 58) ("[A]n offer that requires a confidential settlement rather
than a court judgment seeks something not authorized by the rule."), citing McCauley v
Trans Union, LLC, 402 F3d 340 (2d Cir 2005).
121

122

123
124

See FRCP 68(a).
FRCP 68(a).

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94 (1981).
Id. See also 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations § 1 at 529 (2012) (defining stipulation as
an "agreement, admission, or concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties or
their attorneys, respecting some matter or incident thereto").
127 See Southern Colonization Co v Circuit Court of St Croix County, 203 NW 923,
925 (Wis 1925).
128 See 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations § 7 at 538 (2012).
129 Id § 12 at 544. See also Osborne v United States, 351 F2d 111, 120 (8th Cir 1965)
("[R]elief may be granted from a stipulation under appropriate circumstances.").
130 See 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations § 7 at 539 (2012).
125
126
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that purely procedural stipulations cannot bind the court. 131
Contradictory or confusing stipulations may also be disregarded.1 2 Moreover, the Federal Rules allow courts to outright veto
certain stipulations. For example, FRCP 29 empowers parties to
stipulate to procedures of discovery "[u]nless the court orders
otherwise."133
Rule 68 agreements fit all the criteria for a stipulation. This
becomes most apparent when we look separately at the two
stages of a Rule 68 agreement: (1) the initial offer-acceptance
transaction and (2) the ultimate judgment embodying the
agreement's terms. When parties reach an agreement under the
first half of Rule 68(a), that agreement allows the parties only to
enter judgment against the defendant-a result limited to the
judicial proceeding at hand. No other rights or obligations arise.
In fact, the agreement does not appear to bind the parties at this
stage. The Rule gives parties discretion regarding whether to actually enter judgment by providing that they "may" file their
agreement with the court. 34 Only upon filing does the agreement give rise to a judgment that binds the parties. In a nutshell, the initial agreement amounts to a procedural stipulation
to "allow judgment." Only at stage two-the entry of judgmentdo the substantive terms of the agreement become binding.
Viewing Rule 68 as a stipulation comports with Supreme
Court precedent on the subject. In Marek, the Supreme Court
observed that "the drafters' concern [in Rule 68] was not so
much with the particular components of offers, but with the
35
judgments to be allowed against defendants."' 1 In other words,
the Court viewed the primary function of an agreement reached
under Rule 68 as a procedural event: the allowance of a judgment. This parallels the way stipulations generally contemplate
procedural elements in a judicial proceeding-such as agreements to certain background facts that allow litigants to move
toward the case's actual adjudication-rather than substantive

See, for example, TIF Instruments, Inc v Colette, 713 F2d 197, 201 (6th Cir 1983);
Wechsler v Zen, 140 NW2d 581, 583 (Mich App 1966).
132 See 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations § 7 at 539-40 (2012).
133 FRCP 29.
134 FRCP 68(a). Rule 68 does not give a clear time limit on how long the parties can
wait before filing their agreement. However, courts could easily interpret FRCP 68(a)'s
reference to "within 14 days after being served" as also applying to filing.
135 Marek, 473 US at 6.
131
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or extrinsic ones-such as a contractual agreement that creates
or controls the scope of rights and remedies. 136
A Supreme Court concurring opinion also adopted the word
"stipulate" to describe Rule 68. In a concurrence to Delta
Air
Lines, Inc v August, 137 Justice Lewis Powell characterized Rule
68 as "a proposal of settlement that, by definition, stipulates
that the plaintiff shall be treated as the prevailing party."138 The
Court's majority later adopted this conception in Marek by allowing plaintiffs who had accepted Rule 68 offers to prevail for
purposes of fee-shifting statutes. 139
The Court's treatment of judgments reached through Rule
68 in Delta Air Lines and Marek also implicitly supports treating
the Rule as a stipulation. Had the parties in either case simply
settled their dispute through contract, there would be no discussion of prevailing parties because that issue would have been
moot. In a settlement contract, money changes hands regardless
of which party "prevailed," and the fee-shifting statute does not
control. 140 Instead of taking this view, the Court treated a judgment reached through Rule 68 the same as a judgment reached
through trial, which necessarily triggers a fee-shifting statute.
Accordingly, Rule 68 allows parties to stipulate away the need
for trial, but the agreement has no effect on the extrinsic right to
attorney's fees after a favorable judgment.
Other features of a Rule 68 agreement also resemble a stipulation. The purpose of a stipulation is thought to be "the avoidance of delay, trouble, [ ] expense,"'' and to "reduce the volume
of litigation,"142 which parallels Rule 68's purpose of promoting
settlement. Additionally, Rule 68's insistence on "written notice"'' matches the common requirement that stipulations made
outside court be evidenced in writing.44 Oral contracts, on the
other hand, can be binding even when made outside of court. 145
136 For an important example of the distinction between procedure and substance,
see the Rules Enabling Act, Pub L No 73-415, 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as amended
at 28 USC § 2072 (allowing the Supreme Court to prescribe general rules of "practice and
procedure"-including the FRCP and Rule 68 in particular-but prohibiting rules that
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right").
137 450 US 346 (1981).
138 Id at 363 (Powell concurring) (emphasis added).
139 See Marek, 473 US at 11. See also 42 USC § 1988(b).
140 Of course, the parties will presumably take the fee-shifting statute into account
during negotiations over the settlement amount, but they are not bound by it.
141 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations § 1 at 529-30 (2012).
142 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94, comment a (1981).
143 FRCP 68(a).
144 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94(a) (1981).
145 See, for example, United States v White, 675 F3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir 2012).
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Moreover, other Federal Rules use agreements they characterize as "stipulations" to trigger cost-shifting provisions similar
to Rule 68. Consider FRCP 36 and FRCP 37(c)(2). Rule 36 allows
parties to ask their opponents to admit to certain facts, applications of law to facts, or the genuineness of documents.146 This
saves litigants the time of having to prove each fact or application of law. These admissions are conclusively binding only for
purposes of the pending action-a third party cannot rely on the
admission in another proceeding and admissions cannot be used
for any other purpose. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 36 describe an agreement under the Rule as a
a Rule 36 admisstipulation, noting that "in form and substance
147
sion is comparable to... a stipulation."'
If the opponent fails to stipulate to the items requested and
the requesting party later proves a fact to be true or a document
to be genuine, the requesting party can move for the opponent to
pay the "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
in making that proof."'14 This gives parties an extra incentive to
stipulate to certain facts because failure to do so results in cost
shifting-just like failure to accept an agreement under Rule 68
can result in cost shifting.
Taken together, stipulation under Rule 36 and cost shifting
under Rule 37(c)(2) closely parallel an agreement under Rule
68(a) and cost shifting under Rule 68(d). Rule 36 requests an
agreement on certain facts; Rule 68(a) requests an agreement on
the outcome of a proceeding. Rule 36 agreements bind only parties to the action and have no other use; Rule 68 agreements
bind only parties to the action and have no other use. Rule 37(c)
triggers cost shifting for "failure to admit"; Rule 68(d) triggers
cost shifting for failure to accept. Because the Federal Rules
treat an agreement under Rule 36 as a stipulation, it seems
natural to treat Rule 68 similarly.
Ultimately, the similarities between Rule 68 and stipulations suggest that Rule 68 agreements should be viewed as stipulations to the entry and terms of judgment, rather than fully
realized settlement contracts-a critical difference in light of the
power courts wield to set aside or prevent stipulations that alter
court procedure.

146

See FRCP 36(a).

147

See FRCP 36, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 Amendments.

148

FRCP 37(c)(2).
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Distinguishing revocation of a contract from nullification
of a stipulation.

Even if Rule 68 amounts to a stipulation, courts may conclude that the irrevocability doctrine and the Rule's mandatory
language strip the court of any discretion to prevent entry of
judgment after the plaintiff accepts. But this view overstates the
mandatory nature of Rule 68. It conflates a party's attempt to
revoke an offer-which the irrevocability doctrine prohibitswith a court's power to make procedural decisions that prevent
stipulation-to which the irrevocability doctrine does not apply.
In their discussion of the irrevocability doctrine, courts allowing Rule 68 to override their own judgments have blurred the
line between revocation by the parties and nullification by the
court. For example, the Perkins court adopted broad language to
find that neither the parties nor the court can abridge a plaintiffs power of acceptance. 149 But the doctrine of irrevocability
constrains the defendant, not the court. Irrevocability cases like
Richardson, Erdman, and Fisher dealt with attempts by the defendant to revoke an offer after realizing some mistake has been
made in its wording or calculation of the settlement amount. 150
They did not address the court's power to nullify acceptance.
Ultimately, courts construing Rule 68 offers as stipulations
need not view the Rule with such reverence. As discussed above,
courts enjoy much more discretion when deciding whether to
give binding effect to a stipulation. There is no need to defer on
contractual grounds. And the doctrine of irrevocability does not
constrain the power of the court to nullify a stipulation with an
appropriate procedural event, as the courts in Perkins and Centric-Jones seem to assume.' 5 ' The next Section will argue that final judgment is exactly the kind of procedural event to fill this
role.

149 See Perkins, 138 F3d at 338 (holding that the plain language of Rule 68 mandates that the offer remain valid and open for acceptance for the full ten-day period);
Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 946 (affirming the "well-established and persuasive" view that
offers of judgment are irrevocable for the allotted statutory period and not subject to the
discretion of the court). See also Mallory, 922 F2d at 1279 ("Rule 68 also leaves no discretion in the district court to do anything but enter judgment once an offer has been accepted.").
150 See Richardson, 49 F3d at 762; Erdman, 926 F2d at 879; Fisher, 110 FRD at 76.
151 See Perkins, 138 F3d at 338; Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 946.
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Crossing the Rubicon: How the Standard for Amending
Judgments Impacts Rule 68

The ambiguities of Rule 68 may seem confusing enough, but
its intersection with the law of judgments raises another critical
question: what does summary judgment mean? From the standpoint of preventing a stipulation, the short answer is that summary judgment generally has much less procedural importance
when unresolved claims or issues remain. However, granting
full summary judgment leads to disposal of the case through entry of final judgment, which has a much stronger procedural impact on stipulations. This Section distinguishes summary judgment from final judgment and then surveys situations in which
a final judgment can be amended or altered. Finally, it argues
that the law of judgments prevents parties from stipulating to
the amendment of a final judgment under Rule 68. In other
words, courts will not enforce a Rule 68 agreement after final
judgment has been entered.
1. Distinguishing summary judgment from final judgment.
Summary judgment and final judgment can relate closely to
each other, but they differ significantly in substance. The FRCP
prescribe criteria governing what court memorandums may
qualify as a grant of summary judgment or final judgment.
However, in the most basic sense, both are court orders that the
court clerk will enter into a case docket separately.
FRCP 56 governs summary judgment. The Rule allows a
party to move for full or partial dismissal of a case if the movant
can prove that (1) there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact," and (2) the party is therefore entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.152 The ability to dispose of a case without proceeding to trial promotes a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determina153
tion of every action.'
Traditionally, the prerequisites and purposes of summary
judgment have received far more attention than its procedural
role. Summary judgment comes in two flavors-partial and full.
Partial summary judgment affects the ability of litigants to continue to pursue or revisit a particular issue,54 but the broader
FRCP 56(a).
FRCP 1.See also Warren Freedman, Summary Judgment and Other Preclusive
Devices 1 (Quorum 1989) (discussing the purpose of summary judgment in the Federal
Rules and its role in "obviat[ing] the need for a trial where no fact issues exist").
154 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 10A Federal
Practiceand Procedure§ 2712 at 212-13 (West 3d ed 1998).
152

153
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case usually continues on other elements or causes of action.
Full summary judgment will dispose of the entire case. 155 However, granting the motion itself does not procedurally dispose of
the case; it merely enables the entry of a separatejudgment on
the court docket pursuant to FRCP 79(b) that disposes of the
case. 156 It is that separate judgment-the final judgment-that
effectuates disposal.157
FRCP 58 governs entry of final judgment. It requires that a
final judgment be set out in a separate document from any other
opinion or memorandum,158 and it distinguishes procedural
events that mandate entry of final judgment without court approval from procedural events that require court approval prior
to entry of final judgment.1"9 The court clerk "must" enter final
judgment, unless ordered otherwise by the court, when (1) the
jury returns a general verdict, (2) the court awards only costs or
a sum certain, or (3) the court denies all relief. 160 Final judgments require court approval when the jury returns a special
verdict or the court grants any other form of relief.161 Accordingly, a grant of full summary judgment denying all relief requires
immediate entry of final judgment, unless the court says otherwise. The timing of entry occurs when the separate document is
entered into the court docket or when 150 days have run from
entry of an unseparated judgment.162
In addition to the separate-document requirement, purported final judgments must meet two other criteria. First, some
courts have held that judgments including extraneous text, such
as an explanation of the court's rationale, will fail to meet the
separate-document requirement.163 This further prevents orders
granting summary judgment from also serving as a final judgment.
155 See FRCP 56, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1937 Adoption ("Summary
judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.").
156 FRCP 58(c).
157 See FRCP 58(c) (providing that the timing of entry of final judgment does not
occur until the separate judgment is entered in the civil docket under Rule 79(a)).
158 See FRCP 58(a).
159
160
161

FRCP 58(b).
FRCP 58(b)(1).
FRCP 58(b)(2).

FRCP 58(c).
See, for example, In re Cendant Corp Securities Litigation, 454 F3d 235, 243 (3d
Cir 2006) (holding that a lengthy description of facts and procedural history precludes an
order from complying with the separate-document rule); Otis v City of Chicago, 29 F3d
1159, 1163 (7th Cir 1994) (holding that a Rule 58 judgment "should be a self-contained
document, saying who has won and what relief has been awarded, but omitting the reasons for this disposition, which should appear in the court's opinion").
162

163
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Second, a final judgment must specify the relief awarded to the
prevailing party if the order concludes relief is warranted.164
However, if an order disposes of the plaintiffs case entirely-as
full summary judgment would-the final judgment need not
specify relief.165 In these instances, the disposition of a case is
"easy to infer," and the judgment need not state it explicitly.166
A final judgment leaves nothing left to do in the case except
to enforce its terms. 167 All issues of law or fact essential to the
case have been determined, and, if the court has decided to
award relief, the amount of the damages or the form or scope of
other relief has been defined.168 In short, the case has ended in
the trial court. But final judgments have importance even beyond the trial court. Cases addressing the distinction between
nonfinal and final judgments tend to do so in the context of appellate review,169 and the Supreme Court has held that a "judgment" for the purposes of the Federal Rules is equivalent to a
"final decision" required by statute before appeals courts gain
jurisdiction.10 Thus, while summary judgment and final judgment may seem similar at first, the nature and effect of each differ dramatically.

164 See American Interinsurance Exchange v Occidental Fire and Casualty Co of
North Carolina, 835 F2d 157, 159-60 (7th Cir 1987) (holding that failure to include the
declaratory relief that parties had sued to receive robbed the judgment of finality at the
trial level).
165 See Rush University Medical Center v Leavitt, 535 F3d 735, 737 (7th Cir 2008)
("Unless the plaintiff loses outright, a judgment must provide the relief to which the
winner is entitled.").
166 Id ("Sometimes it is easy to infer the disposition, and then the appeal may proceed despite technical shortcomings.").
167 See Catlin v United States, 324 US 229, 233 (1945) ("A 'final decision' generally
is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.").
168 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13, comment b (1982):

Finality will be lacking if an issue of law or fact essential to the adjudication of
the claim has been reserved for future determination, or if the court has decided that the plaintiff should have relief against the defendant of the claim but
the amount of the damages, or the form or scope of other relief, remains to be
determined.
169 See, for example, American Interinsurance Exchange, 835 F2d at 160 (declining
to exercise appellate jurisdiction due to a lack of finality in the "judgment" entered by a
district court).
170 See Bankers Trust Co v Mallis, 435 US 381, 384 n 4 (1978) ("A 'judgment' for
purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would appear to be equivalent to a 'final
decision' as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.").
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2. Altering, amending, and reconsidering judgments.
Judgments are not the be-all and end-all of civil procedure.
Even after entry of judgment, parties can try to convince a court
that it should reconsider. But the standards that govern reconsideration of a judgment depend at least in part on the kind of
judgment in question. Although some judgments can be amended easily, courts rarely reconsider final judgments.
FRCP 59(e) allows courts to alter or amend judgments if a
motion is filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment. 171 The Rule covers any motion seeking a substantive alteration of the judgment, 172 including motions to reconsider 173
and motions to vacate a judgment. 174 Rule 59(e) does not specify
criteria, but case law has established four grounds for amending
a judgment: (1) to incorporate an intervening change in the law,
(2) to reflect new evidence not available at the time of the trial,
(3) to correct a clear legal error, or (4) to prevent a manifest injustice. 175 Instances under the manifest-injustice ground include
exceptional circumstances like misconduct of counsel.176 Rule
59(e) motions should not be granted when the grant will "serve
no useful purpose"'177 or when the motion attempts to relitigate
old matters, raise old arguments, or present evidence that could
have been presented prior to entry of judgment.178
Critically, the standard of discretion for altering judgments
depends on the case's procedural posture. District courts have
considerable discretion when considering a Rule 59(e) motion to
alter an "interlocutory" judgment-one that does not bring the

171 FRCP 59(e) ("A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than
28 days after the entry of the judgment.").
172 See Hannon v Maschner, 981 F2d 1142, 1144 n 2 (10th Cir 1992) ("Where ...the
motion requests a substantive change in the district court's decision, it may be considered under Rule 59(e).").
173 See Cockrel v Shelby County School District, 270 F3d 1036, 1047 (6th Cir 2001)
('Motions for reconsideration.., are generally treated as a motion to alter or amend the
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).").
174 See Foman v Davis, 371 US 178, 181 (1962) (approving of the appellate court's
treatment of a motion to vacate judgment under Rule 59(e)); Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp
v Nowalk, 420 F2d 858, 859 (3d Cir 1970) (holding that a motion to vacate judgment was
a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e)).
175 See Jacobs v Electronic Data Systems Corp, 240 FRD 595, 599 (MD Ala 2007).
176 See id at 600.
177 Id at 599, citing Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 11
Federal Practiceand Procedure§ 2810.1 at 124-27 (West 2d ed 1995).
17s See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 11 Federal
Practiceand Procedure§ 2810.1 at 163-64 (West 3d ed 2012).
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case to a final resolution. 1 9 However, reconsideration of final
judgment is an "extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly."180 This added scrutiny helps courts avoid backtracking
through judgments that depend on complicated and interrelated
questions.181

Parties who seek reconsideration of a judgment more than
ten days after the entry of judgment must move for relief under
Rule 60(b).182 These motions may be granted under only the ex-

plicit, limited circumstances of
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.183

Subsection (6)'s catch-all category is reserved for "extraordinary
circumstances,"' 18 4 such as misconduct by a witness.185

179 Holland v Valley Services, Inc, 845 F Supp 2d 220, 222 (DDC 2012) ("A district
court may revise its own interlocutory decisions at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.") (citations and
quotation marks omitted). See also Templet v HydroChem Inc, 367 F3d 473, 479 (5th Cir
2004) (noting that courts enjoy "considerable discretion" when deciding whether to reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration but that "such discretion is not
limitless").
180 Templet, 367 F3d at 479, citing Clancy v Employers Health Insurance Co, 101 F
Supp 2d 463, 465 (ED La 2000).
181 See Sussman v Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, PA, 153 FRD 689, 694 (MD Fla 1994)
(stating the need to avoid "backtrack[ing] through the paths of litigation which are often
laced with close questions").
182 See Tracy Bateman Farrell, et al, 27A Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition
§ 62:691 (West 2012).
183 FRCP 60(b).
184 Gonzalez v Crosby, 545 US 524, 535 (2005) ("[Olur cases have required a movant
seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the
reopening of a final judgment."), quoting Ackermann v United States, 340 US 193, 199
(1950).
185 See Richardson, 49 F3d at 765-66.
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3. The stricter standard for amending final judgments
prevents stipulation under Rule 68.
Here is where the pieces come together. Acceptance of a
Rule 68 offer effectively stipulates to the entry of judgment, or
as the case may be, the modification of any judgment previously
entered. But agreement among the parties to allow entry of
judgment does not necessarily bind the court. As the previous
Section explained, judgments are subject to special mechanisms
of amendment and modification. If a judgment has been entered,
Rule 68 cannot mandate the entry of another judgment unless
the parties also move to amend the existing judgment under
86
Rule 59(e) or 60(b).1
But as explained above, the standard for amending a judgment depends on that nature of that judgment. Final judgments
can be modified only "rarely" and in "extraordinary" circumstances under Rule 59(e).187 And none of Rule 60(b)'s subsections
requires granting relief from a judgment upon stipulation by the
parties.18 Even 60(b)(6)'s "any other reason" provision requires a
showing of "extraordinary circumstances," and mere stipulations
are unlikely to meet this standard.189 Thus, acceptance of an offer of judgment may warrant amending some judgments, but not
a final judgment.
Accordingly, if either party can file the offer, notice of acceptance, proof of service, and a motion to amend judgment before the court clerk enters final judgment, that party will have a
procedural method to enforce the stipulation. But if the court enters final judgment before the parties file, their stipulation cannot overcome that judgment except under extraordinary circumstances.
In practice, however, this distinction will probably matter
much less to litigants. This is because most courts grant full
summary judgment and enter final judgment simultaneously,
making the two functionally equivalent.190 In fact, the courts in
Perkins and Day entered final judgment on the same day that

186 Plaintiffs seeking to accept an offer of judgment after the court has ruled on
summary judgment submit motions to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) simultaneously with their proof of acceptance and service on the defendant. See, for example, Perkins, 138 F3d at 338.
187 See note 180 and accompanying text.
188 See note 183 and accompanying text.
189 See note 184 and accompanying text.
190 See FRCP 58(b) (requiring the court clerk to enter final judgment "promptly" after disposal of a case unless the court orders otherwise).
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they granted a full summary judgment.191 Thus, from the perspective of the litigants in those cases, the distinction between
full summary judgments and final judgments is one without a
difference. The parties cannot stipulate to entry of judgment.
Formal distinctions explaining why will not afford the parties
much benefit, and litigants will actually need to note only the
difference between partial and full summary judgment.
But this will not always be the case. For example, a court
might enter partial summary judgment that overlaps with an offer of judgment's terms but does not completely resolve the case.
Or, a court could enter full summary judgment but order the
clerk to postpone entry of final judgment. This might occur, for
example, if the court has answered the legal questions before it
but must make damage calculations that require further submissions by the parties. In this example, no procedural event
prevents the parties from using Rule 68 to bring the case to a
quick close.
Moreover, final judgment provides a uniquely logical place
to abrogate Rule 68 because it differs in kind from other court
orders or intervening incidents. Any number of events will alter
the way both parties value settlement in a case. For example,
the death of a witness or pretrial exclusion of evidence may significantly impact one party's chances of prevailing. Yet, Rule 68
makes no provision for these events, and it is unclear how courts
might draw a line between events that should abrogate the Rule
and events that shouldn't.
Some courts have expressed fear of a slippery slope: abrogating Rule 68 through judgment will pave the way for other
court orders to have a similar effect, they say, eroding the certainty that animates the Rule.192 In their view, the plaintiff must
have fourteen days to accept, and all other intervening events
must be treated consistently. Thus, some courts have interpreted the risk of intervening material events as part of the bargain
a defendant accepts when making the offer.
Final judgment solves this slippery slope problem because it
differs significantly from other court orders and provides a
bright-line rule that allows courts to continue treating all other
material events consistently. Once final judgment is entered, the
defendant has gained more than an increased chance of prevailing.
191 See Judgment Order, Day v Krystal Co, No 1:05-CV-00300 (ED Tenn filed Jan
24, 2007); Docket No 97-2959, Perkins v US West Communications, No 97-2959 (8th Cir
filed July 21, 1997).
192 See, for example, Centric-Jones,848 P2d at 948.
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He has prevailed. Rather than simply overpaying for a resolution to the case, the defendant has lost all reason for paying at
all because litigation has ended. No further judicial economy can
be gained by entering a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and
any further amendments or alterations become "futile" according
to Rule 68's settlement-promotion purpose. 193 This distinction
makes final judgment fundamentally different from all other intervening events, which alter only the chance that a party will
prevail and leave open the possibility of further litigation costs.

The stipulation approach charts a compromise between advocates on both sides of the Rule 68 split. By operating in cases
that involve a grant of summary judgment but the potential for
continuing litigation, the approach honors the policy instincts of
courts like Perkins and the settlement-promoting purpose of
Rule 68. And by ceasing to operate in cases that have truly
reached final resolution, it respects the concerns of futility and
finality expressed in Day.
C.

Beyond Procedure: How the Stipulation Approach Improves
Rule 68's Operation

In addition to resolving the split between courts, the stipulation approach improves Rule 68's operation in three important
ways: (1) it clarifies and simplifies ex ante settlement predictions, (2) it incentivizes sharing information in ways that promotes judicial efficiency, and (3) it does not rely on parties to
contract around the solution. This Section elaborates on each
improvement in turn.
1. Clarifies and simplifies ex ante settlement predictions.
In his examination of the Rule's incentives, Professor Geoffrey Miller laid out a systematic formula for how defendants approach Rule 68 ex ante.194 In its simplest expression, the amount
a defendant offers to settle will depend on the amount of liability
in question, discounted by his estimated chances at trial, plus
the expenses of taking the claim to trial.195 Using this formula,

193
194

Day, 241 FRD at 478.
Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J Legal Stud 93, 104

(1986).
195

Id.

2014]

Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments

Professor Miller described how expenses and discounts affect
Rule 68's effectiveness.196
The same analytical method can be applied to a pending
summary judgment motion. Summary judgment acts as a lowadditional-cost way to resolve the case. Comparatively few additional costs mean the defendant will not raise his settlement
amount-a pretrial settlement will save roughly the same
amount whether it occurs before or after summary judgment.
However, the defendant will discount his offer further if he believes he has a better chance of prevailing at summary judgment
than at trial.197 For example, the defendant might anticipate
that an unlikeable witness will make trial more of a gamble, and
therefore believe summary judgment is his best bet. So, at the
point of summary judgment, defendants calculate their offer using Professor Miller's formula plus an additional discount based
on their perceived chances at summary judgment.
Now imagine the defendant knows ahead of time that the
court will allow the plaintiff to accept his offer even if summary
judgment is first granted in his favor. The defendant appreciates
that a rational plaintiff will accept in this situation because
suddenly the alternative is defeat. Thus, the defendant will
want to modify his previous discount based on the chance that
summary judgment will be granted too soon, allowing the plaintiff to grasp victory from him. But how should he calculate this
discount? Assuming the defendant does not know when the
court will rule, he cannot rationally discount his offer ex ante.
As noted in Part I, practitioners point to uncertainty as a cause
for Rule 68's underuse. So defendants who cannot rationally discount are less likely to use Rule 68 at all.
To avoid this uncertainty, the defendant could try varying
the timing of an offer. For example, the defendant could wait to
extend an offer of judgment until after a ruling on the motion for
summary judgment. But summary judgment motions routinely
take months to decide, and waiting for a court ruling contradicts
the quick resolution that Rule 68 is intended to produce. Waiting may also foreclose the defendant's ability to use Rule 68 altogether if the start of trial grows near. Reversing this strategy
fails to do much better. Defendants who extend an offer of judgment first and wait until the end of the acceptance period before
196 Id.
197 If the defendant believes his chances are about the same at summary judgment
or trial, there is no need to discount. However, the uncertainties of trial-especially a
jury trial-typically make summary judgment more attractive.
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moving for summary judgment inherently make the initial offer
with less knowledge of their case and their opponent's. 198 Rule 68
requires both litigants to think hard about their chances at trial,
and it naturally becomes much more difficult to evaluate success
at a much earlier point in litigation. Again, uncertainty will prevent use. Moreover, requiring careful timing of the offer makes
Rule 68 offers even less flexible and further inhibits their potential for settlement promotion.
Allowing final judgment to nullify Rule 68 solves this problem by making the ex ante calculation easier and avoiding the
need to properly time motions. A defendant who knows that the
court will not allow acceptance after entry of final judgment can
simply discount his offer as usual. A favorable ruling of full
summary judgment means the offer becomes invalid, negating
the need to discount. An unfavorable ruling or a partialsummary judgment ruling will allow the parties to continue litigation, and the defendant can simply make another offer calibrated to his chances and expenses going forward. Finally, the
defendant need not vary the timing of his offer because neither
outcome of summary judgment conflicts with the purpose of his
offer. A favorable ruling ends litigation-the exact situation he
sought. An unfavorable ruling simply renders his offer too lowa trivial difficulty that can be remedied by extending an updated
offer. Thus, a clear default rule preventing acceptance after entry of final judgment promotes the definiteness and predictability needed to induce defendants to extend offers in the first
place.
2. Incentivizes information sharing in ways that promote
judicial efficiency.
Under the current interpretation of Rule 68, both plaintiffs
and defendants have an incentive to keep courts in the dark.
Plaintiffs will not inform the court of a pending Rule 68 offer because they may be able to use such an offer to overturn an unfavorable summary judgment ruling later. Defendants will not inform the court because, while the defendant is willing to accept
settlement, he will still prefer resolution by summary judgment.
Thus, defendants will avoid informing the court of any reason to
postpone ruling on summary judgment.

198 See Miller, 15 J Legal Stud at 95 (cited in note 194) (arguing that the optimal
time for an offer will depend in part on the amount of information available to the defendant about the likely outcome of the litigation).
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Making Rule 68 offers ineffective after final judgment eliminates the plaintiffs incentive to keep courts uninformed. Now,
the plaintiff has a reason to inform the court: the judge may
postpone ruling on summary judgment until after the offer expires, giving the plaintiff a proper chance to accept or reject it.
Presumably, the court will value a chance to dispose of the case
without devoting additional resources to it. And disposition
through settlement will ensure the outcome is more agreeable to
both parties-a better outcome from the court's perspective.
Knowledge of a pending offer also allows courts to exercise
some discretion-either postponing a ruling to allow parties to
reach their own resolution or quickly entering final judgment on
the merits. Advocates for reforming Rule 68 have criticized its
tendency to divorce a case's outcome from its actual merits. 199
This criticism arguably becomes strongest in the context of full
summary judgment, in which a plaintiff cannot prevail on the
merits as a matter of law. With the knowledge of a pending Rule
68 offer, judges have the opportunity to weigh the likelihood and
benefits of settlement against any possible need to rule quickly
on the merits. For example, most courts will presumably view
settlement as the best option for allowing parties to reach a mutually agreeable resolution with minimal judicial costs. However, if a pending offer is unlikely to induce settlement or the case
is clearly frivolous, the court can simply ignore the offer and enter final judgment. This flexibility will help courts determine the
most efficient course of action.
While it should improve the current status quo, this scheme
is no panacea for arbitrary decisions or gamesmanship. Plaintiffs can still choose to keep the court uninformed or attempt to
beat the court to an entry of final judgment on the docket-a determination completely independent of the case's merits. However, the court's ability to enter final judgment simultaneously
with a grant of summary judgment makes it difficult for the
plaintiff to prevail in this way-whether or not the court actually had a chance to consider the Rule 68 offer.200
This proposal may also allow the court to pressure the
plaintiff into accepting an offer before the full fourteen-day period allowed under Rule 68 elapses. Yet, plaintiffs always make
199 See, for example, Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 Ind L J 59, 112 (1997).
200 See Judgment Order, Day v Krystal Co, No 1:05-CV-00300 (ED Tenn filed Jan
24, 2007); Docket No 97-2959, Perkins v US West Communications, No 97-2959 (8th Cir
filed July 21, 1997).
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Rule 68 determinations under time pressure and with limited
information. At least this way, plaintiffs can attempt to avoid
unfavorable time constraints by alerting the court and requesting more time.
3. The irrevocable nature of offers prevents parties from
contracting around the problem.
Finally, parties might simply anticipate summary judgment
and structure the terms of their Rule 68 offers to avoid conflicts.
However, cases interpreting Rule 68 suggest this is not a viable
solution. As the Perkins court noted, a shrewd defendant might
condition acceptance of the offer upon the outcome of the motion
for summary judgment,201 similar to a material-adverse-change
clause that conditions acceptance on the maintenance of certain
conditions in most commercial contracts. 202 Rule 68 fails to address the addition of conditions to the offer, referring only to
terms that the court must enter in the judgment upon acceptance. To date, no circuit court has considered an offer of
judgment that conditioned acceptance upon a pending motion.
Two circuit courts have allowed defendants to condition an offer
upon acceptance by multiple plaintiffs,23 but this condition had
no effect on the timing of acceptance or withdrawal, which distinguishes it from the condition suggested by Perkins. Other
more extreme attempts to place conditions on a Rule 68 offer
have received a more hostile reception.204
More importantly, the irrevocable nature of offers appears
to rule out conditioning acceptance on a pending summary
judgment motion.205 The condition potentially amounts to an impermissible revocation by a party, as discussed in Part I.B. Rule
68 sets an express fourteen-day period for acceptance that defendants cannot alter. Allowing the defendant to shorten that
period through conditions would contradict the Rule's text and
court rulings on impermissible withdrawals. This type of condition
Perkins, 138 F3d at 339.
See Kari K. Hall, How Big Is the MAC?: MaterialAdverse Change Clauses in Today's Acquisition Environment, 71 U Cin L Rev 1061, 1063 (2003) ("[T]he [material adverse change] clause is normally one of the heavily negotiated parts of a merger agreement.").
203 See Lang v Gates, 36 F3d 73, 75 (9th Cir 1994); Amati v City of Woodstock, 176
F3d 952, 958 (7th Cir 1999).
204 See, for example, Frazier v Harris, 218 FRD 173, 174-75 (CD Inl 2003) (rejecting
a condition that effectively gave the offeror the power to reject an acceptance).
205 See Wright, Miller, and Marcus, 12 Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3002 at 92
(cited in note 58) ("[An offer] must be unconditional.").
201

202
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could also open the door to other conditions and invite abuse.
For example, a defendant could condition an offer of judgment
on an event he knows will happen shortly thereafter. Once the
offer is considered "withdrawn," Rule 68(d)'s cost-shifting consequences could be interpreted to punish a plaintiff who barely
had time to consider accepting it. Instead of wading into this
quagmire, courts should prohibit attempts to condition Rule 68
offers on the outcome of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

Rule 68's notorious ambiguity often leaves courts adrift and
contributes to its infrequent use by litigants. But when Rule 68
intersects with more definite rules and doctrines, courts have a
chance to increase certainty and improve Rule 68's operation.
This Comment illustrates that the conflict between Rule 68 and
summary judgment can be resolved by reconsidering the assumption that Rule 68 operates like a contract. By interpreting
Rule 68 as a stipulation and venerating the difference between
summary and final judgments, courts can increase certainty in
Rule 68's operation and, hopefully, promote greater use of the
Rule as its drafters intended.

